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BACKGROUND AND HISTORY.
A. Valuation Discounts in the Family Context.
1. For many years, the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") challenged
valuation discounts, in the context of a family, because of the theory of
family attribution - i.e., minority interests held by a family should be
aggregated to form a controlling block because the family is more likely to
act as one unit. The Service consistently lost on this issue. See, e.g.,
Propstra v. US., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); Estate of Bright v. US.,
658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.
938 (1982); and Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978).
2. In Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, the Service abandoned the family
attribution theory. Rev. Rul. 93-12 involved a gift by a 100% shareholder
of a corporation of 20% of his stock to each of his five children. The
Service ruled that the family's control of the entity would not be
considered in valuing the 20% interests. The Service stated:
For estate and gift tax valuation purposes, the Service will
follow Bright, Propstra, Andrews and Lee in not assuming
that all voting power held by family members may be
aggregated for purposes of determining whether the
transferred shares should be valued as a part of a
controlling interest. Consequently, a minority discount
would not be disallowed solely because a transferred
interest, when aggregated with interests held by family
members, would be a part of a controlling interest. This
would be the case whether the donor held 100% or some
lesser percentage of the stock immediately before the gift.
B. Use of Family Limited Partnerships and LLCs.
1. The family limited partnership (FLP) concept is fairly simple. The client
contributes assets to a limited partnership in exchange for both general and
limited partnership interests. The bulk of the initial capital contribution
typically would be assigned to the limited partnership interests. For
example, the partnership agreement might assign 1% of the initial capital
contribution to the general partnership interests and the remaining 99% to
the limited partnership interests. The client then gifts the limited
partnership interests to his issue (or to trusts for their benefit) while
retaining the general partnership interest.
2. An FLP is a very attractive estate planning tool because it permits the
donor/parent to significantly discount the value of gifts to the
donee/children that might not be discountable if made outright.
3. Two discounts generally are available: a lack of marketability discount
and a minority discount. A lack of marketability discount reflects the fact
that the partnership agreement will restrict the sale or transfer of the
partnership interests so that there is no ready market for those interests.
4. A minority discount reflects the inability of the limited partner to compel
partnership distributions or to compel liquidation to obtain his share of the
assets which the partnership owns. It also reflects the inability of the
limited partner to control partnership investments.
C. IRS Initiates Attacks On Family Limited Partnerships. In 1997, the Service
initiated its attack on FLPs and LLCs through a series of Technical Advice
Memoranda. See, e.g., TAM 9842003 (July 2, 1998); TAM 9736004 (June 6,
1997); TAM 9735003 (May 8, 1997); TAM 9730004 (Apr. 3, 1997); TAM
9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); TAM 9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); TAM 9719006 (Jan. 14,
1997). The TAMs involved situations where (a) liquid assets, such as marketable
securities, were transferred to a limited partnership or LLC; (b) the transferor was
elderly; and (c) the transfer was carried out by third parties (such as children) as
agents under a power of attorney or as trustees.
D. The Service's Arguments. The Service has advanced the following arguments in
challenging the use and validity of FLPs, each of which will be discussed in
greater detail, below:
1. Disregarding the entity.
2. Code § 2703.
3. Code § 2704.
4. Gift upon formation.
5. Code § 2036.
6. Gift of a future interest.
7. Indirect gifts.
II. TAXPAYER VICTORIES.
A. Disregarding the Entity.
1. The Service's Argument. The Service claimed that the formation of an
FLP should be treated as a single testamentary transaction and therefore
disregarded for transfer tax purposes. The Service cites the Tax Court case
of Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, in which the court held that a
minority interest discount was not applicable to stock of a closely held
corporation owned by the decedent although the decedent owned slightly
less than 50% of the stock at her death. T.C. Memo 1990-472. At the
urging of her accountant, Mrs. Murphy had transferred a 1.76% interest to
her children 18 days before her death specifically to reduce her interest
below 50%.
2. Church v. United States 268 F.3 d 1063 ( 5th Cir. 2001), aff'gper curiam 85
AFTR2d 2000-804 (W.D. Tex. 2000) suggests that threshold for a validly
formed partnership is extremely low. The taxpayer formed a limited
partnership two days before her death.
a. The corporate general partner had not been formed prior to her
death, the limited partnership certificate had not been filed with the
state, and assets had not been validly transferred to the partnership.
Mrs. Church transferred $1.5 million of assets (real estate and
marketable securities) to the partnership; her partnership interests
were valued at $617,600.
b. The Service argued that Church did not effectively convey the
securities to the partnership before she died. Alternatively, the
Service also argued that Church made a taxable gift when forming
the partnership, represented by the difference between the value of
the assets she contributed and the value of the partnership interest
she received.
c. The District Court ruled in the estate's favor, rejecting the
government's arguments. As to the securities, the court found that
Church did not hold legal title; she had an equitable beneficial
interest because legal title was held by a brokerage house. Further,
the court found that Church clearly expressed her intent to
relinquish her beneficial interest when she executed the partnership
agreement. On the gift issue, Judge Garcia wrote that the
government's argument "confuses the market value of the assignee
interest passing at death with the value of the Partnership interest
Mrs. Church received in return for her contribution. The two
interests are not comparable. More importantly, the Government
ignores the fact that this was a pro rata partnership that did not
confer a financial benefit on, or increase the wealth of, any
partner." Furthermore, the court found that there was no donee and
no gratuitous transfer. Judge Garcia also held that the partnership
was not a sham as the government contended, finding that the
partnership had bona fide business purposes and was not formed to
reduce estate taxes. The court noted that Church did not have the
unilateral right to amend or revoke the partnership agreement and
that the partners had no express or implied agreement that Church
could continue to use or possess partnership property within the
meaning of Code § 2036.
3. See also, Kerr v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2002), aff'g 113
T.C. 443 (1999), Strangil, 115 T.C. 35 (2000), Jones v. Commissioner,
116 T.C. 11 (2001), and Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 36 (2000).
B. Code 2703.
1. Statutory Language. Under Code § 2703(a), for purposes of estate, gift,
and generation-skipping transfer taxes, the value of any property is
determined without regard to any right or restriction relating to the
property. Code § 2703(b) states that a right or restriction will not be
disregarded if the following requirements are met:
a. The right or restriction is a bona fide business arrangement;
b. The right or restriction is not a device to transfer the property to
the natural objects of the transferor's bounty for less than full and
adequate consideration in money or money's worth; and
c. At the time the right or restriction is created, the terms of the right
or restriction are comparable to similar arrangements entered into
by persons in an arms-length transaction.
2. The Service's Argument. The Service argues that the use of a partnership
structure to hold assets is, in and of itself, a restriction with respect to the
property and should be disregarded. The Service also argues that the
exceptions to Code § 2703(b) should not apply because the use of a
partnership is a "device to transfer property" for a less than full and
adequate consideration.
3. Strangi 1, 115 T.C. 35 (2000), the decedent's son-in-law, acting pursuant
to a power of attorney formed a family limited partnership funded largely
with marketable securities. The decedent owned a 99% limited partnership
interest and 47% of the corporate general partner. The Court found that
the decedent retained effective control over the partnership. Nevertheless,
the Court ruled that the decedent formed a valid partnership and that Code
§ 2703(a)(2) did not operate to disregard the limited partnership. See also,
Church, 268 F3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001).
4. However, consider a recent District Court case from the Western District
of Pennsylvania, Smith, 94 AFTR2d 2004-5283 (W.D.Pa. 2004) which
held that Code § 2703(a) applied to a provision in a limited partnership
agreement which restricted the transferability of the interest. The Court,
however, held that the question of whether the taxpayer could avail itself
of the exception found Code § 2703(b) was a question of fact that required
further inquiry. The Court granted partial summary judgment on the Code
§ 2703(a) issue, but deferred on the Code § 2703(b) issue.
C. Code § 2704.
1. Statutory Language. Code § 2704(b) provides that an "applicable
restriction" on the right of a donee to liquidate his or her interests may be
disregarded for gift and estate tax purposes, thereby increasing the value
of the gift or the size of the federal gross estate. An "applicable
restriction" is a limitation on the ability to liquidate or dissolve the entity
(in whole or in part) that is more restrictive than the limitations that would
apply under the state law generally applicable to the entity in the absence
of the restriction.
2. The Service's Argument. The Service contended that under Code
§ 2704(b) any limitations on the right to liquidate the interests that were
more restrictive than the state's default rule would be disregarded.
3. Kerr v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 490 (5h Cir. 2002), affg 113 T.C. 443
(1999). The Tax Court held that a couple transferred limited partnership
interests, not assignee interests, to two grantor retained annuity trusts
(GRATs), but that they were entitled to apply liquidity discounts in
valuing those interests because Code § 2704(b) did not apply. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed that the Tax Court properly held the dissolution and
liquidation provisions in the partnership agreements were no more
restrictive than the limitations under Texas law, and weren't applicable
restrictions.
4. Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-202 (2000). The analysis
employed by the Tax Court in Kerr was adopted by Judge Wells in
Harper, a family limited partnership case involving marketable securities,
where the decedent's revocable trust held 99% limited partnership and her
two children collectively held a 1% general partnership interest.
D. Gift Upon Formation.
1. The Service's Argument. The Service has argued that, if valuation
discounts are appropriate in valuing limited partnership interests, the value
that is "lost" by the taxpayer is a deemed gift of an equivalent amount to
the other partners. For example, assume a taxpayer gifts an asset having a
value of $ 1,000,000 to an FLP. The 99% limited partnership interest is
discounted by 35%. The Service argues that the reduction in value of the
taxpayer's 99% limited partnership interest, as compared to its aliquot
share of the underlying assets, constitutes a gift of $350,000, an amount
equal to the amount of the reduction. See, e.g., Estate of Trenchard v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1995-232 (1995) and Estate ofBosca v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1998-251 (1998).
2. Taxpayer Arguments.
a. The gift tax is an excise tax on the privilege of transferring
property; it is an excise tax on the transfer, not on the subject of
the gift. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2 and 25.251 1-1(h)(1). Before the
gift tax can be assessed, a transfer and a transferee must exist. On
creation of a partnership, no person becomes a transferee, and
without a transferee, there is no basis for the assessment of the gift
tax.
b. Value appears and disappears and that fact does not mean that a
transfer has occurred from one person to another. If A, B, and C
each contribute $100 to form a corporation and receive 1 share of
stock in return, the value of A's stock is presumably valued at less
than $100 because A does not possess the right to liquidate the
corporation and receive a return of his investment. This
diminution in value does not mean that A has made a taxable gift
to his children, B and C. There is no transfer to B and C. B and
C's shares are also valued at less than $100.
3. The Service has been largely unsuccessful with respect to the gift upon
formation argument. Seee.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 11 (2001),
Church v. United States 268 F-3r' 1063 (5th Cir. 2001), Kerr v.
Commissioner, 292 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2002), Shepherd, 115 TC 376, aff'd
283 F3d 1258 (11' h Cir. 2002) and Strangi1, 115 T.C. 35 (2000).
III. CODE § 2036.
A. Statutory Provisions. Code § 2036(a) provides as follows:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except
in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or
for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death -
1. the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from the
property, or
2. the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
B. The Service's Argument Under Code § 2036(a)(1).
1. The Service has been most successful under Code § 2036(a)(1) involving
the retention of "possession or enjoyment" of property. Retention of
possession or enjoyment may take place by express or implied
understanding, and need not be under a legally binding agreement.
2. The Service has been successful in cases where the following "bad facts"
were present:
a. Most of a decedent's assets were transferred to the partnership,
without sufficient assets remaining outside of the partnership for
the decedent's needs.
b. The decedent's continued occupancy of a residence transferred to
the partnership without contemporaneous payment of rent.
c. Commingling of personal and partnership assets.
d. Disproportionate distributions.
e. Use of partnership funds for personal expenses.
f. Timing of distributions, where partnership distributions were based
on the decedent's personal needs.
3. The "Bad Facts" cases are discussed in greater detail in Section IV, infra.
C. The Service's Argument Under Code 2036(a)(2).
1. In Strangi, the Service argued under Code § 2036(a)(2) that the decedent
retained a right in conjunction with other persons to designate the persons
who will enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
2. Taxpayers and their counsel, up to that time, relied on the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Byrum to shield them from Code § 2036(a)(2).
3. Code § 2036(a)(2) and Strangi are discussed in greater detail in Section V,
infra.
D. The Exception for a "Bona Fide Sale for an Adequate and Full Consideration."
1. Taxpayers have had mixed results in arguing that the exception for a
"bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration" should shield them
from the application of Code § 2036.
2. The cases that have considered the bona fide sale exception are discussed
in greater detail in Section VI, infra.
IV. THE "BAD FACTS" 2036(a)(1) CASES.
A. Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-242 (1997).
1. The decedent formed a separate limited partnership with each of her three
children and transferred a substantial percentage of her interests in the
limited partnerships to family members, using the annual exclusion to
avoid taxable gifts. Afterwards, she deposited income from the
partnerships in her personal account, in which she deposited income from
other sources, and used the account to pay her personal expenses as well
as partnership expenses.
2. The Service once again argued that the limited partnership interests should
be disregarded based on its Code § 2703 analysis. However, the Tax Court
decided that the transferred interests should be included in the decedent's
estate under Code §§ 2036(a) and 2038 and decided the case in favor of
the Service without invoking Code § 2703.
3. The Court found that there was an implied agreement that the decedent
would retain the economic benefits of the property and, therefore, because
the decedent had transferred property and retained the right to enjoyment
of the income from the property until her death, the transferred limited
partnership interests were includible in her estate under Code
§ 2036(a)(1). The Schauerhamer case points out the importance of
complying with all the formalities under state law and the terms of the
operative agreements to ensure that the entity will be recognized under
state law and the property transferred to the entity will not be includible in
the transferor's estate under Code §§ 2036(a) and 2038.
B. Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 9 (2000).
1. The Tax Court held that property transferred by an individual to a family
limited partnership was includible in his gross estate because he retained
possession and enjoyment of it, and the right to its income.
2. In June 1993, shortly after having been diagnosed with terminal cancer,
Charles formed a revocable living trust and a family limited partnership.
He appointed himself and his children as cotrustees and authorized each
trustee to act on behalf of the trust. The trust was the partnership's only
general partner. Charles transferred all of his property (except for his car,
personal effects, and a small amount of cash) to the partnership, including
the property in which he had a life interest. He signed deeds individually
and on behalf of his wife's estate transferring property to the trust and then
signed deeds as trustee transferring the property to the partnership. He
deposited over $20,000 of partnership funds to his personal checking
accounts. He lived in one property before and after he transferred it to the
trust and partnership. No rent was paid to the trust or partnership for use of
the residence. Charles gave each of his two children a 30.4% interest in
the partnership on October 22, 1993. He died on August 21, 1994 and his
estate did not include any of the assets transferred to the trust and
partnership. It did include his 34.46% limited partnership interest and his
1% general partnership interest.
3. The Service determined that the assets transferred to the partnership
should have been included in his estate.
4. The Tax Court noted that, for purposes of Code § 2036, a transferor
retains the enjoyment of property if there is an express or implied
agreement at the time of the transfer that the transferor will retain the
present economic benefits of the property, even if the retained right is not
legally enforceable. The Tax Court found that Charles did not curtail his
enjoyment of the transferred property after he formed the partnership. It
said that nothing changed except legal title. Charles managed the trust
which managed the partnership. He was the only trustee to sign the articles
of limited partnership, the deeds, the transfer of lien, and any document
which could be executed by one trustee on behalf of the trust. He was the
only trustee to open brokerage accounts or sign partnership checks.
Furthermore, the Tax Court found that Charles commingled partnership
and personal funds. He deposited some partnership income in his personal
account and he used the partnership's checking account as his personal
account. He lived at the same property without paying rent before or after
he transferred it to the trust and to the partnership.
5. The estate maintained that Charles' fiduciary duties as a general partner
and trustee precluded him from retaining enjoyment of the assets. The Tax
Court disagreed. It said that these duties did not deter Charles from
continuing to possess and enjoy the house in which he lived or the other
assets he conveyed to the partnership. The court also stressed that the
children, as co-trustees, did nothing to preclude him from doing so. This
suggested to the court that Charles and his children had an implied
agreement to allow him to continue to enjoy partnership property for life.
The estate also argued the Charles received full and adequate
consideration for the transferred property. The court disagreed, finding
that the children gave nothing to Charles or the partnership when he
transferred property to the trust.
C. Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-121 (2002).
1 . The taxpayer formed a family limited partnership. However, the taxpayer
failed to observe all of the formalities of the partnership, commingled
funds, etc.
2. The Court reviewed four missteps by the taxpayer: (1) commingling of
funds, (2) the delay in transferring assets to the FLP, (3) a history of
disproportionate partnership distributions, and (4) the testamentary
characteristics of the arrangement. The Court concluded that Code §
2036(a) applied and that all discounts should be disallowed.
3. The Tax Court's view of these cases is instructive: "Hence we are again
met with an example of indifference by those involved toward the formal
structure of the partnership arrangement and, as a corollary, towards the
degree of separation that the Agreement facially purports to establish ...
we find equally compelling indicia of an implied understanding or
agreement that the partnership arrangement would not curtail decedent's
ability to enjoy the economic benefit of assets contributed to HFLP ...
decedent did not divest himself economically of the contributed assets ...
We additionally take note of decedent's advanced age, serious health
conditions and experience as an attorney."
D. Estate ofAbraham v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2004-39 (Feb. 18, 2004).
1. The decedent, received three significant properties from the estate of her
deceased husband. The decedent's children, her guardians and guardians
ad litem entered into a court-approved plan to rearrange the decedent's
financial affairs to reduce estate taxes. The plan required that the three
properties be transferred to three family limited partnerships, each having
a corporate general partner the stock of which would be owned by a trust
for the decedent. The children were not to receive partnership income
until the general partner had set aside sufficient sum to pay for the
partnership's administration and the support of the decedent. The
corporate presidents (the decedent's guardians ad litem), ran the
partnerships, acting in a fiduciary capacity for the decedent, and they had
complete discretion to determine how much money decedent needed from
the partnerships to meet her needs. The decedent initially held a 98-
percent limited partnership interest in two of the partnerships, the
corporate general partners each held a one-percent interest, and one of the
decedent's daughters each held a one-percent interest. The decedent
initially held a 99-percent limited partnership interest in the other
partnership, and the corporation held the remaining 1-percent. The
decedent later gave 30 percent limited partnerships to three of her
children, two in exchange for cash transfers and the third in exchange for
the settlement of certain claims.
2. The Service stated that the value of the properties was includible in the
decedent's gross estate under Code § 2036(a), because the decedent had
retained the lifetime income and beneficial enjoyment of those assets. The
court stated that the decedent continued to enjoy the right to support and
maintenance from all the income of the partnerships, because the decree
that authorized the creation of the partnerships stated that the decedent's
needs for support were contemplated first from the partnership income,
and only thereafter, could the children receive their proportionate shares of
income from the partnerships. The decedent's support needs were actually
treated as an obligation of the partnerships. The court also noted that one
of the decedent's children admitted the existence of a pre-arrangement to
maintain the status quo with respect to her mother's financial situation.
E. Estate of Hillgren v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2004-46 (March 3, 2004).
1 . The decedent became the limited partner of a family partnership. The
decedent retained a 99.95 percent capital interest in the partnership and a
75-percent profits interest, and she gave her brother, Marc, the remaining
interests as general partner. The decedent contributed seven properties to
the partnership, though she did not actually change the title to the
properties or formally assign to the partnership the leases on the properties
for five months. The agreement allowed the decedent's brother to act for
the partnership without disclosing the existence of the partnership, and he
did, in fact, do so. The partnership was "designed generally to be invisible
to the public and to persons with whom the decedent and [Marc} Hillgren
did business." The partnership agreement stated that the partnership need
not have a separate bank account, and that it could use the accounts of the
decedent's revocable trust and proprietorship. Initially, the partnership
records included among its assets the decedent's residence, and the
partnership paid the mortgage and property taxes on that residence. An
adjusted journal entry posted after the decedent's death removed the
residence and related expenses from the partnership's books. There were
no minutes of meetings of the partners and the certificate of limited
partnership was not filed with the Secretary of State until nearly two years
after the decedent's death. The decedent's brother, as the general partner,
had sole discretion regarding partnership distributions, and during the five
months that the partnership existed during the decedent's lifetime, all
distributions were made to or for the benefit of the decedent; none were
made to the brother. The distributions were made in amounts to enable the
decedent to pay her living expenses, and she was dependent on the
partnership cashflow to cover those expenses. The partnership also paid
the costs of the decedent's estate, including estate tax installments. The
partnership assets were managed by a corporation all of whose business
was managing properties owned by various entities controlled by the
decedent's family. The same person managed the properties before and
after the formation of the partnership. The decedent and her brother did
enter into a business loan agreement covering four of the seven properties
held by the partnership. The agreement was a complex document that
included a contract for services provided by decedent's brother, who
facilitated forbearance and extensions of other loans, an agreement for the
brother's personal guarantee of certain loans, an agreement extending
extended a $1 million line of credit to the decedent, and a security
agreement encumbering three properties. The business loan agreement
gave the brother authority, for 29 years, to determine whether to sell any
of four properties subject to the agreement, and granted him an irrevocable
power of attorney for duration of her ownership of properties. The
decedent's estate reported the decedent's 99.5 percent partnership interest
at $2,266,000, based on an independent appraisal that claimed discounts
for lack of control and marketability.
2. The Tax Court agreed with the Service that the value of the partnership
assets should be included in the decedent's gross estate under Code §
2036(a), with no discounts for the existence of the partnership itself. In
particular, the court noted that: (a) the proximity of the creation of the
partnership to the death of the decedent (five months), and the fact that the
decedent had earlier attempted suicide and did, in fact, die by suicide,
suggests that the transaction was testamentary in nature; (b) the
management of the assets remained the same both before and after
creating the partnership, suggesting an agreement to retain the beneficial
enjoyment of those assets; (c) the argument that the partnership was
created as a premarital asset protection device fails, because the decedent
broke up with her boyfriend and apparent marriage candidate before the
creation of the partnership [The court also noted that the estate made
"inconsistent representations during discovery and during trial" regarding
whether the boyfriend was even aware of the partnership.]; (d) there was
no solid evidence that the decedent and her brother negotiated at arm's
length over the terms of the partnership or the contributions of services to
be made by the brother; (e) the decedent's brother was both general
partner of the partnership and trustee of the decedent's revocable trust, that
held the decedent's interest in the partnership; (f) the brother ignored the
terms of the partnership agreement when "it suited him"; (g) funds were
commingled; (h) the partnership form was ignored frequently; (i) the
decedent's psychiatrist testified that the decedent had not expected that the
partnership would change her relationship with her brother or her role in
the management of the partnership assets; () the decedent had planned to
transfer her residence to the partnership; (k) the decedent received all of
the partnership income distributions. The court held, however, that the
business loan agreement was a bona fide contract that would be taken into
account by any buyer of the four properties to which it related. The
business loan agreement, the court stated, restricted the control over those
properties and reduced their marketability, justifying discounts of 55
percent for one property, 35 to 40 percent for three others, and an
additional five percent for lack of voting rights.
V. CODE § 203 6(a)(2) - STRANGI
A. Estate of Strangi v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2003-145 (May 20, 2003), on rem 'd
from Gulig v. Comm 'r, 293 F.3rd 279 (5th Cir., 2002), aff'g in part, rev'g in part,
Estate of Strangi v. Comm 'r, 115 T.C. 478 (2000).
1. Decedent's son-in-law acting under a durable power of attorney, created a
Texas family limited partnership and transferred to it most of the
decedent's personal and investment assets. Decedent received a 99-
percent limited partnership interest and 47 percent of the stock of the
corporate general partner. Decedent's family owned 52 percent of the rest
of the stock of the general partner, and an unrelated charity owned one
percent of the stock. Decedent died two months later.
2. The Tax Court initially held that: (a) the creation of the partnership was
not a taxable gift; (b) the partnership had economic substance; (c) the
terms of the partnership agreement were not restrictions on the transfer the
underlying assets, under Code § 2703(a)(2); and (d) the Service claim that
the decedent had retained control over the transferred partnership assets
was not raised in a timely manner. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court on the substantive issues, but stated that the Service could argue the
application of Code § 2036(a), because its motion was made early enough
to prevent prejudice to the taxpayer.
3. On remand, the Tax Court held that the partnership assets transferred by
the decedent were includible in his gross estate, because he had retained
their beneficial enjoyment, under Code § 2036(a)(1). The court noted
particularly that: (a) the decedent was in very poor health when he
established the partnership; (b) the partnership paid many of the
decedent's personal expenses, including personal in-home health care,
surgery for the decedent's care-giver, funeral expenses, estate
administration expenses, and related debts of the decedent's estate, and a
specific bequest to the decedent's sister (the court was not swayed by the
partnership having treated these expenses as advances and having made
corresponding distributions to the general partner, because the decedent's
99.43-percent interest meant that no significant distributions were actually
made to anyone else); (c) the decedent continued to live in his residence
after transferring it to the partnership and the decedent only accrued rent
that was not actually paid for more than two years; (d) the decedent's
99.43 percent interest made the arrangement seem testamentary, rather
than a true joint enterprise; and (e) the documents were forms provided by
a private group, with little, if any, input from other family members.
4. The court also stated that the partnership assets could be included in the
decedent's gross estate under Code § 2036(a)(2), because he controlled
their beneficial enjoyment. The court noted that the general partner could
(i) unilaterally determine partnership distributions, and (ii) could, acting
with the other partners, terminate the partnership and cause its assets to be
distributed. The court noted that Regulations § 20.2036-1(b)(3) taxes a
decedent with respect to powers that are exercisable only with the consent
of others.
5. The court also rejected the estate's reliance on United States v. Byrum, 408
U.S. 125 (1972), because: (a) the control was vested in someone who was
the decedent's son-in-law, his attorney, and his attorney-in-fact; (b) the
partnership held primarily investment assets, whereas the corporations in
Byrum were operating businesses whose ability to distribute dividends was
subject to business exigencies not relevant to the Strangi partnership; (c)
the other stockholders in Byrum were largely unrelated to the decedent; (d)
there was an independent trustee in Byrum, who could decline to distribute
to the beneficiaries any amounts distributed by the Byrum corporations;
and (e) the fiduciary duties held by directors and shareholders in Byrum
were not relevant in Strangi, because the few holders of other interests
were unlikely to enforce them.
VI. BONA FIDE SALE - FULL AND ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION EXCEPTION
A. Estate of Stone v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2003-309 (Nov. 7, 2003).
1 . The decedents, husband and wife, together created five family limited
partnerships, to hold various businesses and investments that the decedents
owned. The decedents had initially been drawn to the family limited
partnership as a means of settling disputes among their children regarding
the management of various assets, but their estate planning attorney had
later explained to them how these devices could also reduce their estate
tax liabilities. They created the five partnerships, in consultation with
their children. Each of their children became a general partner, together
with the parents, in one or more of the partnerships, and participated
actively in the operations of the partnership. The children each
contributed their own assets to buy their shares of the partnerships, though
some of these assets had originally been given to the children by their
parents. The parents' attorney consulted with the attorneys for the
children in selecting the terms of the partnerships, though the parents'
attorney drafted the agreements.
2. After both parents died relatively close together, the Service asserted that
the value of the partnership assets should be included in the decedents'
estates under Code § 2036(a)(1), as a transfer with a reservation of
beneficial enjoyment.
3. The Tax Court disagreed, and held that Code § 2036(a)(1) did not apply,
because the decedents had transferred their assets to the partnerships in
bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration. The court
distinguished its contrary holdings in several other cases, noting that: (a)
all of the partners transferred their own assets to the partnership in
exchange for their proportionate interests, though some of those assets
were the results of prior gifts from the decedents; (b) upon the termination
or dissolution of each of the partnerships, the partners were entitled to
distributions from each such partnership in amounts equal to their
respective capital accounts; (c) each partner was represented in the
decision-making by separate counsel; (d) the decedents retained enough
assets outside the partnership to provide for their own needs and support;
(e) creating the partnership was motivated at least partially by nontax
business concerns; and (f) the decedents' children became general partners
and participated actively in managing the partnerships. Cf. Estate of
Reichardt v. Comm 'r, 114 T.C. 144 (2000), Estate of Thompson v.
Comm 'r, T.C. Memo.2002-246; Estate of Harper v. Comm "r, T.C.
Memo.2002-121; Estate of Strangi v. Comm "r, T.C. Memo.2003-145.
B. Kimbell v. United States. (5t" Circuit 2004) 93 AFTR 2d 2004-2400.
1 . Ruth A. Kimbell died in March 1998 at the age of 96. When she died,
Mrs. Kimbell held interests in three entities: (1) the R.A. Kimbell Living
Trust ("Trust"), (2) the R.A. Kimbell Management Co., LLC ("LLC"), and
(3) the R.A. Kimbell Property Co., Ltd. ("Partnership").Trust was created
by Mrs- Kimbell in 1991 and fully revocable by her before her death.
Thus, its interests and Mrs. Kimbell's interests were treated as one for tax
purposes. Mrs. Kimbell and David Kimbell were co-trustees, and David
Kimbell was paid a monthly fee to manage Trust. LLC is a Texas limited
liability company established in January 1998. It was owned 50% by
Trust, 25% by David Kimbell and 25% by his wife (Mrs. Kimbell's
daughter-in-law). David Kimbell was the manager of LLC. Partnership is
a Texas limited partnership created on January 29 1998 (two months
before Mrs. Kimbell's death) by Trust and LLC, which contributed 1% of
the capital of Partnership and was its general partner. Trust contributed
99% of the capital and yet was only a limited partner. Partnership had a
term of 40 years (i.e., until Mrs. Kimbell would have been 136 years old).
As Mrs. Kimbell had a 50% interest in LLC through her ownership of
Trust and a 100% interest in Trust, her real interest in Partnership was
99.5%.
2. After Mrs. Kimbell died, David Kimbell, as her executor, filed estate tax
returns with the Service, which audited them and found that the value of
Mrs. Kimbell's 99% interest in Partnership was $2.463 million, not $1.257
million as reported. David Kimbell paid the increased taxes and ultimately
went to district court seeking a refund of $837,089, claiming that the
Service had overvalued the estate.
3. At the District Court, David Kimbell argued that Mrs. Kimbell's transfer
of assets to Partnership was a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth. The district court disagreed. It
said there was no credible evidence that Partnership's formation was the
product of an arm's length transaction between unrelated parties. The
court said that there weren't even two parties because ownership interests
in Partnership were held by two entities: 99% by Trust, which was wholly-
owned by Mrs. Kimbell, and 1% by the LLC, which was 50% owned by
Trust. The court said that even if Partnership resulted from a bona fide
sale, David Kimbell didn't establish that Mrs. Kimbell received adequate
and full consideration for the sale. Mrs. Kimbell, through Trust,
contributed 99% of the capital for Partnership and in return received a
99% interest in Partnership. Mrs. Kimbell received no consideration other
than the interest in Partnership. David Kimbell, before becoming the
general partner of Partnership, was already managing both Trust, where
99% of the assets of Partnership came from and LLC from where the other
1% came from (of which 0.5% were from Trust). David Kimbell argued
that Mrs. Kimbell "irrevocably" transferred her assets to Partnership and
thus qualified under the retained income or rights exception. The district
court said that this argument didn't fly. Mrs. Kimbell (through Trust),
although formally a limited partner, owned 99% of Partnership, and an
additional 0.5% of Partnership through her 50% interest in LLC. Under
the partnership agreement, Mrs. Kimbell, as a limited partner with a 99%
interest in Partnership, could at any time remove the general partner, and
either appoint herself or someone she chose to be the new general partner,
who could then distribute the income back to Mrs. Kimbell. Thus, Mrs.
Kimbell retained the right to the income from the property. Accordingly,
the district court found the transfer to be includible in Mrs. Kimbell's
estate under Code § 2036.
4. The Fifth Circuit said that for Mrs. Kimbell's transfer to Partnership to
qualify as a bona fide sale, it had to be a sale in which she actually parted
with her interest in the assets transferred and the partnership/transferee
actually parted with the partnership interest issued in exchange. For the
sale to be for adequate and full consideration, the exchange of assets for
partnership interests must be roughly equivalent so the transfer does not
deplete the estate. In addition, when the transaction is between family
members, it is subject to heightened scrutiny to ensure that the sale is not a
sham transaction or disguised gift.
5. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Mrs. Kimbell's transfer was for full and
adequate consideration because:
a. The interest credited to each of the partners was proportionate to
the fair market value of the assets each partner contributed to
Partnership,
b. The assets contributed by each partner to Partnership were
properly credited to their respective capital accounts, and
c. On termination or dissolution of Partnership the partners were
entitled to distributions from it in amounts equal to their respective
capital accounts.
6. The court in Kimbell noted with regard to the immediate decrease in value
of the decedent's assets after the partnership was formed that, "The
business decision to exchange cash or other assets for a transfer-restricted,
non-managerial interest in a limited partnership involves financial
considerations other than the purchaser's ability to turn right around and
sell the newly acquired limited partnership interest for 100 cents on the
dollar. Investors who acquire such interests do so with the expectation of
realizing benefits such as management expertise, security, and
preservation of assets, capital appreciation, and avoidance of personal
liability."
7. The sale was "bona fide" in Kimbell because:
a. The transferor actually parted with his interest in property
transferred in exchange for a partnership interest. Put differently,
the transferor did not use partnership assets in the same way both
before and after the transfer.
b. Mrs. Kimbell retained sufficient assets outside of the partnership
for her support. Partnership formalities were followed, and
partnership assets were not used for personal expenses.
c. There were significant nontax reasons for the arrangement (and
therefore it was not a disguised gift or sham). These included: (a)
protection of Mrs. Kimbell from personal liability in connection
with working oil and gas interests; (b) partnership assets could
continue intact, and could be passed down to family members
without being broken up; and (c) the arrangement provided
centralized management and a mechanism to appoint successors to
the decedent's son, who was currently managing the partnership.
C. Turner v. United States, _ F3d. __, 94 AFTR 2d 2004-5764 (3rd Cir.
9/1/2004).
1 . The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the estate of an individual
who transferred $2.8 million in securities and other assets to two family
limited partnerships in exchange for pro-rata partnership interests had to
include the full date of death value of the transferred assets under Code §
2036.
2. In 1993, Theodore Thompson, his daughter Betsy T. Turner, and her
husband George Turner, formed the Turner Partnership and Turner
Corporation. Mr. Thompson contributed $1,286,000 in securities, along
with notes receivable from Betsy's children totaling $125,000, in
exchange for a 95.4% limited partnership interest in the Turner
Partnership. George contributed $1,000 in cash and real property valued at
$49,000 in exchange for a 3.54% limited partnership interest. Turner
Corporation, the sole general partner, held the remaining 1.06% interest.
Shares in Turner Corporation were issued to Mr. Thompson (490 shares or
49%), Betsy (245 shares or 24.5%), George (245 shares or 24.5%), and an
unrelated tax-exempt entity (20 shares or 2%). Mr. Thompson and his son
Robert Thompson formed the Thompson Partnership on April 30, 1993,
and the Thompson Corporation on April 21, 1993. Mr. Thompson
contributed $1,118,500 in securities, along with notes totaling $293,000,
in exchange for a 62.27% limited partnership interest. Robert contributed
mutual funds worth $372,000, and a ranch property appraised at $460,000
in exchange for a 36.72% limited partnership interest. Thompson
Corporation, as general partner, held the remaining 1.01% interest. Mr.
Thompson and Robert each held 49% of Thompson Corporation and an
unrelated third party held the remaining 2% interest. As of July 1993, Mr.
Thompson, then age 95, had transferred $2.8 million in assets-$2.5
million in the form of marketable securities-to the Turner and Thompson
Partnerships. He retained $153,000 in personal assets, and received an
annual income of $14,000 from two annuities and Social Security. At the
time of transfer, he had annual expenses of $57,202, and an actuarial life
expectancy of 4.1 years.
3. The Turner Partnership assets consisted primarily of marketable securities
contributed by Mr. Thompson, which the partnership continued to hold in
his brokerage account with minimal post-transfer trading. The Turner
Partnership engaged in several business transactions, although none
produced economic gains. The Turner Partnership also made loans to
members of the Turner family. Although the partnership formally charged
family members interest on these loans, interest payments were often late
or not paid at all, and loans were frequently reamortized. But the
partnership never pursued enforcement action against any of its debtors
nor made loans to anyone outside the Turner family. Like the Turner
Partnership, most of the Thompson Partnership assets consisted of
marketable securities contributed by Mr. Thompson and Robert Thompson
and there was little post-transfer trading. In 1993, each partnership made
cash distributions of $40,000 to Mr. Thompson which he used to provide
holiday gifts to family members. In 1995, the Thompson and Turner
Partnerships made cash distributions to him of $45,500 and $45,220
respectively. During the same time period, he made gifts of interests in
both partnerships to individual family members. In March 1995, the
Thompson Partnership distributed $12,500 to Mr. Thompson to pay for
some personal expenses.
4. Mr. Thompson died on May 15, 1995. On May 27, 1995, the Turner and
Thompson Partnerships respectively sold $347,000 and $350,000 in
securities to partially fund bequests in his will and pay his estate taxes.
Mr. Thompson's estate tax return reported that he held a 87.65% interest
in the Turner Partnership and a 54.12% interest in the Thompson
Partnership valued at $875,811 and $837,691 respectively, and that his
shares in Turner Corporation and Thompson Corporation were worth
$5,190 and $7,888 respectively. The estate calculated these values by
applying a 40% discount rate to the net asset value of the partnerships and
corporations for lack of control and marketability.
5. In January 1999, the Service issued a notice of deficiency in the amount of
$707,054, adjusting the taxable estate from $1,761,219 to $3,203,506 after
disallowing the claimed discounts. The estate went to Tax Court. In an
amended answer to the estate's petition, the Service contended that the full
fair market value of the assets transferred by Mr. Thompson to the
partnerships should be returned to his gross estate under Code § 2036(a)
because he retained control and enjoyment over the transferred assets
during his lifetime.
6. The Tax Court found that the family partnerships were validly formed and
properly recognized for federal estate tax purposes but nevertheless
included the transferred assets in the estate under Code § 2036(a) . The
Tax Court found an implied agreement existed at the time of transfer that
Mr. Thompson would retain lifetime enjoyment and economic benefit of
the transferred assets. In support of this finding, the Court noted that both
Betsy and George Turner had sought assurances from financial advisors
that Mr. Thompson would be able to withdraw assets from the
partnerships to make gifts to family members, and that the partnerships in
fact made such distributions to him. The Tax Court also determined that
the transfers did not qualify for the full and adequate consideration
exception because the transactions were not motivated by legitimate
business concerns. According to the Tax Court, the family partnership was
a mere "recycling of value" and Mr. Thompson's receipt of a partnership
interest in exchange for his testamentary assets was not full and adequate
consideration.
7. After reviewing the record, the Third Circuit found no clear error in the
Tax Court's finding of an implied agreement between Mr. Thompson and
his family that he would continue to be the principal economic beneficiary
of the contributed property, which was sufficient to trigger Code §
2036(a)(1) . The Third Circuit stressed that, as the Tax Court had found,
Mr. Thompson did not retain sufficient assets to support himself for the
remainder of his life, as calculated at the time of transfer. It said that this
fact supported the implied understanding with the children. The Third
Circuit said that Mr. Thompson's dejure lack of control over the
transferred property did not defeat the inference of an implied agreement
under the circumstances of the case.
8. The Third Circuit also agreed with the Tax Court that there was no
transfer for consideration within the meaning of Code § 2036(a). The
Third Circuit stressed that neither partnership had engaged in any valid,
functioning business enterprise. Although the partnerships did conduct
some economic activity, these transactions did not rise to the level of
legitimate business operations.
9. The Third Circuit also emphasized that the form of the transferred
assets-predominately marketable securities-was significant to its
holding. Other than favorable estate tax treatment resulting from the
change in form, the Court said that it is difficult to see what benefit could
be derived from holding an untraded portfolio of securities in a family
limited partnership with no ongoing business operations. In short, the
Third Circuit said that where the transferee partnership does not operate a
legitimate business, and the record demonstrates that the valuation
discount provides the sole benefit for converting liquid, marketable assets
into illiquid partnership interests, there is no transfer for consideration
within the meaning of Code § 2036(a).
10. The Third Circuit also concluded that there was no bona fide sale within
the meaning of Code § 2036 because there was no discernible purpose or
benefit for the transfer other than estate tax savings.
11. The Court implied that the case at hand was different from Kimbell, where
the Fifth Circuit found that there was both full and adequate consideration
and a bona fide sale for a transfer of assets to a family limited partnership
where the transferred assets were working oil and gas interests and the
transfer was motivated by a desire to achieve centralized management and
protection from personal environmental liabilities.
VII. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN.
A. Annual Exclusion Gifts - Hackl v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. No. 14 (2002).
1 . In 1995 and 1996 Albert and Christine Hackl gave their children and
grandchildren membership units in Treeco, a limited liability company
that Albert formed to hold and operate tree farming properties. When
Albert bought the timberland, he sought to provide investment
diversification in the form of long-term growth and future income. The
land he bought had little or no existing salable timber. Albert and
Christine gave interests in the company to family members in 1995. The
couple reported the gifts on their gift tax returns and elected to treat them
as made one-half each by Albert and Christine under Code § 2513. They
also treated the gifts as qualifying for Code § 2503(b)'s $10,000 annual
exclusion. The couple continued the gifting program in 1996, but
transferred membership units in Treeco to their minor grandchildren's
trust. The couple treated the 1996 gifts as they had the 1995 gifts. At the
time of the gifts, Albert correctly anticipated that Treeco and several
successor entities would generate losses and make no distributions for
many years. The IRS disallowed the exclusions for 1996.
2. The Tax Court, deciding in the Service's favor, noted that the dispute
turned on whether the transfers amounted to gifts of a present or future
interest. Because the gifts failed to confer substantial present economic
benefit by reason of use, possession, or enjoyment of the property or the
income from the property, the court concluded that they failed to qualify
for the Code § 2503(b) exclusion. In reaching its decision, the court
rejected the Hackls' argument that when a gift takes the form of an
outright transfer of an equity interest in property, no further analysis is
needed or justified. The court held that to follow this logic was to sanction
exclusions for gifts based only on "conveyancing form," without inquiring
into whether the donees received rights that differed from those that would
have come from a traditional trust arrangement. In examining the facts and
circumstances of the Hackls' case, the court held that any economic
benefit the donees could have ultimately obtained from their receipt of
Treeco units was future, not present.
3. The Tax Court based its decision primarily on the terms of the LLC
Operating Agreement. The terms discussed by the Tax Court included the
authority given to Mr. Hackl as manager, the inability of members to
withdraw their capital accounts, the inability of members to sell interests
to outsiders, and the inability of members to compel distributions. The
Court concluded, "...the terms of the Treeco Operating Agreement
foreclosed the ability of the donees presently to access any substantial
economic or financial benefit that might be represented by the ownership
units."
B. Indirect Gifts- Senda, TC Memo 2004-160.
1. The donors (a husband and wife) created two FLPs (FLP I and FLP II).
The donors signed the FLP I agreement on April 1, 1998. The partnership
agreement provided that a .01% limited partnership interest was initially
held in trust for each of the donors' three minor children. On December 28,
1998, the donors contributed 28,500 shares of MCI WorldCom stock to
FLP I by transferring the stock from theirjoint brokerage account to the
brokerage account of FLP I. By fax dated December 28, 1998, the donors
informed their accountant that they had transferred stock to FLP I, and
sought advice as to what percentage of partnership interests they should
transfer to the children. On that same day, the husband gave each child (or
trust for that child) a 29.94657% limited partnership interest in FLP I, and
the wife gave each child (or trust for that child) a 0.0434% limited
partnership interest in FLP I. The certificates of ownership reflecting the
transfers were not prepared and signed until several years later.
2. The donors signed the FLP II agreement on December 17, 1999. As with
FLP I, the partnership agreement provided that a .01% limited partnership
interest was initially held in trust for each of the donors' three minor
children. On December 20, 1999, the donors contributed 18,477 shares of
MCI WorldCom stock to FLP II by transferring the stock from their joint
brokerage account to the brokerage account of FLP 1H. On that same day,
the donors gave to each child, in trust, a 17.9% limited partnership interest
in FLP II. By fax dated December 22, 1999, the donors informed their
accountant that they had transferred stock to FLP II, and sought advice as
to the percentage of partnership interests they should transfer to the
children to maximize their annual gift tax exclusions and use all of their
remaining unified credits. On Jan. 31, 2000, the donors gave to each child,
in trust, an additional 4.5% limited partnership interest in FLP II.
3. On their 1998, 1999, and 2000 gift tax returns, the donors reported the
transfers as gifts of partnership interests to their children. The values of
the partnership interests were determined by multiplying the value of the
transferred stock (as to which there was no dispute) by the percentage of
the partnership interests transferred to the children, and then applying lack
of marketability and minority interest discounts.
4. The Service conceded that the Jan. 31, 2000 gifts were gifts of partnership
interests, not gifts of stock. But the Service argued that the December 28,
1998 transfer of stock to FLP I, and the December 20, 1999 transfer of
stock to FLP II, coupled with the transfer of limited partnership interests
to the donors' children, were indirect gifts of the stock to the children.
Thus, the Service argued that the stock, not the partnership interests, had
to be valued for gift tax purposes. According to the Service, "the transitory
allocations to [the donors'] capital accounts, if such allocations even
occurred at all, were merely steps in integrated transactions intended to
pass the stock to the [donors'] children in partnership form."
5. The Tax Court agreed with the Service, saying that the donors had
presented no reliable evidence that they contributed the stock to the FLPs
before they transferred the partnership interests to their children. The court
said that the donors were "more concerned with ensuring that the
beneficial ownership of the stock was transferred to the children in tax-
advantaged form than they were with the formalities of FLPs," and noted
that the husband, as general partner, did not maintain any books or records
for the partnerships other than brokerage account statements and
partnership tax returns. The tax returns were prepared months after the
transfers of the partnership interests, and thus were unreliable in showing
whether the donors transferred the partnership interests to the children
before or after they contributed the stock to the partnerships. The same
was true of the certificates of ownership reflecting the transfers of the
partnership interests, which were not prepared until at least several weeks
after the transfers. And the letters that the donors faxed to their accountant
after they had funded the partnerships did not establish-as the donors
contended-that the donors first funded the partnerships and then
transferred the partnership interests to their children. The faxes established
only that the donors had funded the partnerships; they did not show what
the partnership ownership interests were immediately before the funding,
or how the stock was allocated among the partners' capital accounts at the
time of the funding. The court concluded that the value of the children's
partnership interests was enhanced upon the donors' contributions of stock
to the FLPs. Thus, the transfers were indirect gifts of stock to the children.
VIII. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED.
A. What Should Planners Do About Strany?
1. Estate planners need to pay careful attention to how partnerships are
structured and administered, because Code § 2036(a) is a potent basis for
the Service challenge. The decision in Strangi should not cause
practitioners to doubt the general utility of this technique, in appropriate
cases.
a. First, this decision has been appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which
affirmed the refusal of a district court to apply Code § 2036(a)(2)
to a similar family limited partnership in Church v. United States,
268 F.3rd 1063 (5th Cir. 2001)(unpublished opinion). In addition,
the Fifth Circuit adopted a bright-line, objective standard in
Kimbell, which suggests it may do the same in Strangi.
b. Second, the opinion of the Tax Court in Strangi was a
memorandum decision, issued without review by the whole court.
Strangi, therefore, represents the view of one judge, more than that
of the entire court.
c. Third, the Tax Court stated that its analysis was based on the
"particular structure" of the Strangi arrangements. A different
result might well occur if the partnership agreement required that
all net earnings be distributed currently, if significant interests are
given to other family members, and especially if significant
interests were given to trusts controlled by independent trustees.
d. Fourth, the Tax Court's rationale that Code § 2036(a)(2) applied
even though the donor could direct the beneficial enjoyment of the
partnership only with the consent of all of the other partners should
not be read too broadly. Read literally, this would negate any
discounts for intrafamily transfers, because the donees could
always agree to return the gift to the donor, or to dispose of the gift
as the donor wished. The court may have been more swayed by
the fact that the donor gave away only .53 of one percent of the
total partnership interests, and it might reach a contrary conclusion
if there were very significant partnership interests transferred to
others (including, hopefully, trusts with independent trustees).
2. Estate planners should consider the following steps to minimize or avoid
the application of Code § 2036(a) to family limited partnerships:
a. The general partners should keep detailed contemporaneous
records of their activities, and send copies to the limited partners
(for information purposes, only).
b. Have partnership stationery, to assure that the general partner
never acts in a different capacity.
c. Recite the non-tax business reasons for establishing the
partnership.
d. Never pay personal expenses from the partnership assets, even if
capital account adjustments are made.
e. Do not transfer personal use assets to the partnership or otherwise
commingle personal and investment/business use assets.
f. Never put too much of the donor's wealth in the partnerships; the
donors should retain enough assets on which to live comfortably.
g. Limited partners should pay for their partnership assets with their
own assets. If they do not have assets, the donors should make
gifts and let the gifts gather some age, before creating the
partnership.
h. Family members or trusts to whom the client wishes to pass the
bulk of the partnership assets should themselves be general
partners and participate in the operations of the enterprises.
i. All partners should be represented by counsel and consulted in the
preparation of the governing instruments.
j. Consider a provision, like one used in the Stone documents, that
precludes anyone voting for a general partner through a power of
attorney (Contrast the emphasis in Strangi that the general
partner's son-in-law ran the partnership under a power of attorney).
k. Create and fund the partnership as early as possible, to minimize
any appearance that it is testamentary in nature.
1. Have someone else hold all of the general partnership interests, to
remove any right to control beneficial enjoyment.
m. Give or sell significant limited partnership interests to others,
particularly including trusts with independent trustees.
n. Do not make distributions discretionary - either preclude
distributions during the donor's lifetime, or require distribution of
all income.
o. Create two classes of general partnership interests, one of which
has control over distributions, and the other which manages the
partnership assets. The donor can then transfer the former,
retaining the latter. For existing partnerships, there is a Code §
2035 issue.
p. Include a mix of assets, such as real estate, or, in the case of
Kimbell, oil and gas interests, into the partnership. In Kimbell, the
oil and gas interests only comprised 11% of the portfolio, but may
have been the saving grace.
q. Document that the general partner is acting in a fiduciary capacity
to the other partners; pare down or eliminate exculpatory language
that benefits the general partner.
B. What Should Planners Do About Hackl?
I1. Many planners consider Hackl as an aberrant case of bad facts creating
bad law. Nevertheless, Hack/ is a reported case that should not be ignored,
especially if the nature of the underlying partnership assets will be slow to
generate current income to the partnership.
2. Practitioners may want to consider granting a "put option" to the donee of
a limited partnership interest in which the donee is entitled, for a limited
period of time, to put the gifted interest back to the partnership (or the
donor) in exchange for a cash payment equal to the fair market value of
the gifted interest, taking into consideration all available valuation
discounts.
